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Abstract
This article considers the effect of austerity-induced public
spending cuts on the English civil justice system. In doing so
it initially examines two fundamental changes engendered
by the effect austerity has had on civil court fees and legal
aid: first, a challenge to the traditional commitment in Eng-
lish procedure to adversarial process, and a concomitant
increase in inquisitorial or investigative processes; and sec-
ondly, the growth in use of unqualified individuals to act as
advocates in court for individual litigants who are unable to
afford legal representation. It then turns to consider what, if
any, effect austerity has had on simplified processes availa-
ble in English civil procedure.
Keywords: Austerity, court fees and legal aid, adversarial
and inquisitorial process, McKenzie Friends, simplified pro-
cess
1 Introduction
Austerity, which is to say the pursuit of a policy of pub-
lic spending cuts by government, is an important issue
in England and Wales (England) and has been since, at
least, the 2010 general election.1 It arose as a conse-
quence of the 2007 financial crisis and, most pertinently,
the recapitalisation of the UK banking sector by the
government in 2008. Since that time public sector
spending has been subject to regular scrutiny by govern-
ment in pursuit of both economic and political aims, i.e.,
in order to eliminate the structural deficit in public
spending, stimulate the economy, maintain confidence
in the UK’s ability to meet its debt obligations,2 and
politically, as an aspect of a commitment to neoliberal-
* DPhil, Senior Fellow, UCL Judicial Institute, University College, London,
email: j.sorabji@ucl.ac.uk.
1. It is outwith the ambit of this article to consider the background, doctri-
nal underpinnings, or potential consequences of public sector spending
reductions, for a discussion see M. Blyth, Austerity – The History of a
Dangerous Idea (2013); D. Grimshaw and J. Rubery, Reinforcing Neo-
liberalism: Crisis and Austerity in the UK, in S. Lehndorff (ed.), A Tri-
umph of Failed Ideas: European Models of Capitalism in the Crisis
(2012).
2. See, for instance, Centre for Local Economic Strategies, Austerity
Uncovered (2014), available at <https:// www. tuc. org. uk/ sites/ default/
files/ TUC%20Final%20Report%20Dec’14_ 1. pdf> (last accessed, 15
November 2015), at 13; R. Skidelsky, George Osborne’s Cunning Plan,
The Spectator (29 April 2015).
3. Grimshaw and Rubery, above n. 1.
ism,3 to create a smaller State.4 There is no reason to
believe that this will change as a consequence of the
2015 general election and every reason to believe it will
continue;5 further reductions in public spending of
between 25% and 40% are highly likely post-2015.6
Government scrutiny of public expenditure has led to
significant reductions in public sector funding; freezes
on public sector pay; and a reduction in overall employ-
ment in the public sector.7 The justice system has not
been exempt. Spending cuts have resulted in rationalisa-
tion of the court estate, reductions in court service staff
numbers, improved efficiency in court service adminis-
tration in order to reduce costs, and a significant reduc-
tion to legal aid provision.8 Further such reductions,
both those announced prior to the general election and
additional ones determined following the election, are
planned during 2015. In respect of the former, an
8.75% reduction in legal aid will take effect after June
2015.9 In respect of the latter, HM Treasury has
required the Ministry of Justice to reduce its expendi-
ture by £249 million; a reduction that follows one of
£500 million imposed in 2014.10 This article looks at a
number of ways in which austerity has, and has not,
affected the civil justice system. First, it considers two
areas where austerity, in the form of changes to civil
legal aid and civil court fees, is having a real impact:
England’s historic commitment to adversarial process,
4. See, for instance, D. Cameron M.P., P.M., Lord Mayor’s Banquet
Speech, 11 November 2013, available at: <https:// www. gov. uk/
government/ speeches/ lord -mayors -banquet -2013 -prime -ministers -
speech> (last accessed, 15 November 2015).
5. J. van Reenen, Austerity: Growth Costs and Post-Election Plans (2015),
available at: <http:// cep. lse. ac. uk/ pubs/ download/ EA020. pdf> (last
accessed, 15 November 2015), at 5; R. Crawford, C. Emmerson, S.
Keynes & G. Tetlow, Post-Election Austerity: Parties’ Plans Compared,
2015, available at: <http:// www. ifs. org. uk/ uploads/ publications/ bns/
BN170. pdf> (last accessed, 15 November 2015).
6. HM Treasury, Spending Review (2015), at 7.
7. See D. Grimshaw, S. Marino & J. Rubery, Public Sector Pay and Pro-
curement in the UK, 2012, available at: <https:// research. mbs. ac. uk/
european -employment/ Portals/ 0/ docs/ UK -national%20report. pdf>
(last accessed, 15 November 2015), esp. at 11, for figures relating to
the Ministry of Justice.
8. See Ministry of Justice and C. Grayling L.C., Press Release, Reform of
the Courts and Tribunals (28 March 2014), ‘HM Courts & Tribunals
Service will deliver a programme of reform to meet the needs and
expectations of the 21st century at a lower cost to the public, with a
one-off investment to deliver savings in excess of £100 million per year
by 2019/20’, available at: <https:// www. gov. uk/ government/ news/
chris -grayling -reform -of -the -courts -and -tribunals> (last accessed, 15
November 2015).
9. S. Vara M.P. (the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Courts and
Legal Aid), Ministerial Written Statement: Legal Aid (HCWS22, 10 June
2015).
10. C. Smith, MoJ Hit with further £249m of CUTS, Law Gazette (4 June
2015).
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and the growing use of non-lawyers to provide legal
assistance for litigants. In this regard there is a discerni-
ble and, by English standards, radical trend, and one
that may recast the nature of English civil justice signifi-
cantly. Secondly, it considers two areas, which have
recently undergone reform: the English small claims
process and the form of mediation related to it, small
claims mediation. These areas could have undergone
reform as a consequence of austerity. They could, for
instance, have been made available to a wider range of
cases in order to combat the consequences of civil legal
aid cuts. What reform there was cannot, however, prop-
erly be attributed to reductions in public spending. Nor
could such reforms have counteracted the effects of aus-
terity in any event.
2 Civil Court Fees, Civil Legal
Aid, Questioning the
Fundamentals
This section is divided into two parts. The first consid-
ers changes since 2007 to civil court fees and their
potential consequences. The second considers changes
to civil legal aid over the same period and how they have
called into question fundamental aspects of the English
adversarial system of civil justice.
2.1 Civil Fees
Historically, the English civil justice system was funded
from general taxation with a subsidy paid by court users
through court fees. In 1982 the, then, government rejec-
ted this approach. The historic approach was replaced
with one that required the system to be fully funded
through court fees.11 General taxation would only be
used to make up any funding shortfall; i.e., the taxpayer
would subsidise court users.12 The rationale for this
reform was the belief that the civil justice system simply
provides a service for consumers who should be expec-
ted to pay for it.13 In practice this has meant the State
has had to pay a significant subsidy each year, as court
fees have never been sufficient to meet their purpose.
From 2011 to 2013 the funding shortfall required the
State to provide approximately £110-125 million annu-
ally by way of subsidy.14 Since the shift in approach, the
government has repeatedly and unsuccessfully attemp-
11. Ministry of Justice, Court Fees – Proposals for Reform (Cm8751, 2013),
at 4 and 9, per S. Vara M.P., ‘For many years [now], the civil and family
courts have operated under the principle that those who use the courts
should pay the full cost of the service they receive.’
12. See H. Brooke, Should the Civil Courts be Unified? (2008), at 29 ff.; M.
Zander, The State of Justice (2000), at 39 for a discussion.
13. H. Genn, Judging Civil Justice (2010); R. Dingwall and E. Cloatre, Van-
ishing Trials?: An English Perspective, 7 Journal of Dispute Resolution
51, at 67 (2006).
14. Ministry of Justice, (Cm8751, 2013), at 11-12. Also see Judiciary of
England and Wales, The Response of the Senior Judiciary to the Minis-
try of Justice Consultation Paper Court Fees: Proposals for Reform
(Cm8751) (2014), at 2.
ted to reduce and thereby to eliminate the State’s annual
subsidy.15
The financial crisis and its consequences brought this
need into sharp focus. As part of the government
requirement to reduce public spending, the Ministry of
Justice was required to reduce its budget by over a third
from 2010 to 2016.16 This had consequences for the civil
courts. As the Justice Minister, Shailesh Vara M.P.,
explained, in the context of reform proposals in 2013,
…the courts must be properly financed so that they
have the resources they need to deliver their services,
as well as the funds they need to invest in improving
them…But we can’t ignore the economy either. This
government made deficit reduction our top priority.
We have taken some tough decisions, and the signs of
recovery are there for all to see. Yet there is still more
to do to bring public spending into line with what we
can afford. The courts cannot be immune from that,
and the cost to the taxpayer must fall…17
The taxpayer subsidy to the civil justice system thus
had to be eliminated in order to enable the Ministry to
play its part in securing an overall reduction in its, and
the government’s, budget.18 This was to be achieved in
a number of ways.
First, court fees were to be increased in order to ensure
that court users paid cost price for the service they
received. Secondly, some court users would be required
to subsidise others. They would do this by paying
‘enhanced fees’, i.e., fees above cost.19 The rationale for
this innovation was to ensure that the Ministry could,
finally, ensure that the civil courts were entirely self-
funding. It was to enable the State to remove any
remaining present and future taxpayer liability to fund
the civil justice system.20
Taken together these two reforms, the latter of which
was effected through primary legislation in 2014,21 were
anticipated to do two things: first, increase fee income
by £105 million per annum; and secondly, via the use of
enhanced fees, bring in further, additional, income of
15. See, for instance, Department of Constitutional Affairs, Civil Court Fees
(CP10/2004); Ministry of Justice, Civil Court Fees (CP5/2007); Ministry
of Justice, Civil Court Fees 2008 (CP31/2008); Ministry of Justice, Fees
in the High Court and Court of Appeal Civil Division (CP15/2011).
16. Ministry of Justice, (Cm8751, 2013) at 6, ‘the government has made
reducing the fiscal deficit a top priority, in order to set the economy on
course for growth. Under the terms of its Spending Review settlements
of 2010 and 2013, the Ministry of Justice is committed to reducing its
budget by over a third by 2015/16. The courts, and those who use
them, must make a contribution to reducing public spending.’
17. Ministry of Justice (Cm8751, 2013), at 4, and see n. 7.
18. The majority of the subsidy arises because civil court fees are, them-
selves, used to subsidise fee remissions for impecunious users of the
family court system, i.e., the government subsidises the civil courts,
which in turn subsidise the family justice system: see above n. 14, at
3-4.
19. Ministry of Justice (Cm8751, 2013), at 4, and see n. 7.
20. Ministry of Justice (Cm8751, 2013), at 27 ff. And by extension to
remove the taxpayer from having to fund the family justice system.
21. Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, s180, and see
Ministry of Justice (Cm8751, 2013), at 28.
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£190 million per annum.22 They were to do so by, for
instance, increasing fees for money claims of £5,000 to
£15,000 by 81% and for judicial review applications by
216%.23 Issue fees for some high value cases were to
increase by 576%.24 Yet further fee increases, via
enhanced fees, were proposed in 2015 in order to gener-
ate additional income of £55 million. The rationale for
this further increase was to assist the Ministry in meet-
ing further spending reduction targets by enabling it to
eliminate its liability to bear the cost of fee remissions in
civil cases.25 In other words enhanced fees were,
amongst other things, to enable the Ministry to move
its, the States’, responsibility for securing access to jus-
tice for the impecunious to court users.26 Rather than
the taxpayer subsidise the impecunious, wealthy liti-
gants would be required to do so. Apart from enhanced
fee increases, which as at June 2015 had not yet been
introduced, the various fee increases came into effect in
2014 and 2015.27 Further increases are expected in
2016.28 The exact consequences of these reforms, which
as noted are not yet fully implemented, remain unclear.
Those that are in force have not been in force long
enough to produce empirical data concerning the impact
on litigants and on claims being issued, although they
have produced concern amongst the legal community
generally.29 In terms of anticipated impact two points
can be made.
First, the government concluded that there would be no
real detriment to litigants, such that the increase would
reduce rates of issue, i.e., the increases would have no
22. Ministry of Justice (Cm8751, 2013) at 45; for a discussion see Judiciary
of England and Wales, (2014) ibid., at 4 ff.
23. Civil Justice Council, Response to Ministry of Justice Consultation Paper
Court Fees: Proposals for Reform (2013), at 1.
24. See Lord Pannick, debate on Civil Proceedings and Family Proceedings
Fees (Amendment) Order 2015, (Hansard, 4 March 2015: Column
310), ‘If you want to sue for between £10,000 and £200,000, you will
need to pay an upfront fee of 5% of your claim. To claim £200,000,
you will need to find £10,000. That is a 576% increase on the current
fee of £1,515.’ Also see the Table of percentage increases set out at
Civil Justice Council, Response to Ministry of Justice Statutory Consul-
tation Letter Court Fees: Enhanced Charging, 2014, at 2.
25. Ministry of Justice, Enhanced Court Fees – The Government Response
to Part 2 of the Consultation on Reform of Court Fees and Further Pro-
posals for Consultation (2015), at 8.
26. See Judiciary of England and Wales, above n. 14, at 4 ff., ‘This marks a
fundamental change in policy. Until now the Government has accepted
that fee remissions, provided in the public interest for those unable to
pay court fees, should be borne by society at large.’
27. The Civil Proceedings Fees (Amendment) Order 2014 (SI 2014/874);
Civil Proceedings and Family Proceedings Fees (Amendment) Order
2015 (SI 2015/576).
28. Ministry of Justice, Courts and Tribunal Fees – The Government’s
response to consultation on enhanced fees for divorce proceedings,
possession claims, and general applications in civil proceedings and
Consultation on further fee increases (2015).
29. Comment reported generally in the Law Gazette and New Law Journal
and in the consultation responses to the Ministry of Justice’s various
consultations, by way of example, see above n. 14; Litigation Trends
Survey 2015 – Fees a Crowd, New Law Journal (January 2015); Small
Businesses Chasing Late Payment will be Hit by Court Fee Rise, Bar
Council, 19 January 2015, available at: <http:// www. barcouncil. org. uk/
media -centre/ news -and -press -releases/ 2015/ january/ small -businesses -
chasing -late -payment -will -be -hit -by -court -fee -rise>/ (last accessed, 15
November 2015); J. Hyde, Court Fee Hike Set for Next Week, Law Gaz-
ette (2 March 2015).
real, adverse impact on access to justice, or on the aim of
increasing fee income. It did so on the basis of a research
study it commissioned to accompany its reform propos-
als (the 2013 research report). This study, which rested
on an evidence base of eighteen telephone interviews,
formed the basis of the Ministry’s conclusion that court
fee levels were not a significant factor in individuals’
decision-making process when they considered whether
to commence proceedings.30
There are, however, problems with the 2013 research
study and its evidence base. First, it is difficult to see
how such a small number of interviews could be seen to
be properly robust; that such a small survey could pro-
vide a valid foundation for sound conclusions. It is
instructive here to consider that the Ministry of Justice,
in a previous examination of the effect of court fee
increases in 2007 (the 2007 research study), used a sam-
ple of 544 court users and concluded on the strength of
that even small increases in court fees would adversely
affect claiming rates: the greater the increase the greater
the adverse effect.31
Secondly, and a consequence of the limited number of
interviewees, it cannot be said that the study is properly
representative of court users. Of the eighteen interview-
ees, six were large debt recovery organisations with their
own in-house legal teams, two were debt recovery agen-
cies with their own in-house legal teams, four were
solicitors who specialised in debt recovery, two were
personal injury solicitors, and four were private client
family law solicitors.32 The study therefore failed to
consider the potential impact on individual litigants,
small and medium businesses, or solicitors in these
areas, even if it could be said – which it cannot – that it
properly considered the areas of debt recovery, personal
injury, and family law work. Equally, it failed to consid-
er entirely the effect of court fee increases on any liti-
gants or solicitors outside these areas, i.e., in immigra-
tion, social security, employment, contractual, negli-
gence, clinical negligence, landlord and tenant, judicial
review etc., disputes.
Given these two methodological flaws it is difficult to
see what, if any, weight could be given to the 2013
research study’s conclusions, not least because the pauc-
30. Ministry of Justice (Cm8751, 2013) at 28 and its accompanying
research paper, Ministry of Justice, Potential Impact of Changes to
Court Fees on Volumes of Cases Brought to the Civil and Family Courts
(Ministry of Justice Analytical Services Insight Paper, 2013), at 1; and
see, I. Pereira, P. Harvey, W. Dawes & H. Greevy, The Role of Court
Fees in Affecting Users’ Decisions to Bring Cases to the Civil and Fami-
ly Courts: A Qualitative Study of Claimants and Applicants (Ministry of
Justice Analytical Series 2014), at 43-44, which on an evidence base of
31 interviews of litigants who had brought claims concluded that fee
increases would, in general, not deter individuals bringing claims. While
its evidence base was greater than that of the study upon which the fee
increases were predicated, it is still not of such a level as to be robust
numerically or, given its focus on individuals who had chosen to bring
claims, qualitatively robust. Neither the 2013 nor 2014 studies begin to
approach the 2007 study in quantitative or qualitative terms.
31. Ministry of Justice Research Unit, What’s Cost Got to Do with It? – The
Impact of Changing Court Fees on Users (Ministry of Justice Research
Series 4/070, 2007), at 7.
32. Ibid., at 55 ff.
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ity of that study’s evidence base cannot but be highligh-
ted by the strength of the 2007 study’s evidence base.
Given the comparison that can be drawn between the
two studies, rather than placing any weight on the 2013
study’s conclusions, the better conclusion is that to be
drawn from the 2007 study, i.e., contrary to the view
taken by the government that the 2013 fee increases will
have no adverse effect, its early research demonstrates
that there will be adverse consequences on claiming
rates, such that the higher the fee increase the fewer
claims will be issued.
Secondly, comparative evidence from the Employment
Tribunal suggests that the potential adverse impact may
be severe. Historically, claimants were not required to
pay issue fees to bring Employment Tribunal claims. In
2013 issue fees were introduced in order to deter vexa-
tious claimants and help reduce government expendi-
ture.33 The new fees, described as relatively modest34 by
the government, produced a significant reduction in
claims being issued. As noted by Pyper and McGuin-
ness,
The introduction of fees coincided with a steep
decline in the number of cases received. Employment
tribunals received 32,671 fewer single claim cases
during October 2013-September 2014 compared to
the previous year, a 64% decrease. The number of
multiple claim cases was down 3,527, a 67%
decrease.35
The government has accepted that the result was causal
not coincidental.36 The reforms thus produced a signifi-
cant decrease in claims notwithstanding the fact that the
fees were set at a low level. Figures are not available to
show the percentage of claims prior to the fee introduc-
tion that could properly be defined as vexatious.37 It is
not therefore clear what proportion of the decrease in
claims can properly be viewed as non-vexatious, i.e.,
genuine claims. On the assumption, however, that only
a small number of claims are properly vexatious, it is not
difficult to draw the conclusion that the percentage
decrease in claims has produced a real decline in genu-
ine claims being litigated. This is not an unreasonable
assumption as only 13% of claims were, historically,
33. The Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees
Order 2013 (SI 2013/1893), for a discussion see, D. Pyper and F.
McGuinness, Employment Tribunal Fees (House of Commons Briefing
Paper, Number 07081, 12 January 2015); also see Tribunal Statistics
Quarterly April–June 2014, Ministry of Justice Statistics Bulletin; Tribu-
nals and Gender Recognition Certificate Statistics Quarterly July–Sep-
tember 2014, Ministry of Justice Statistics Bulletin; Tribunals and Gen-
der Recognition Certificate Statistics Quarterly October–December
2014, Ministry of Justice Statistics Bulletin and M. Downer et al., Evalu-
ation of Acas Early Conciliation Scheme (Research Paper 04/15, 2015),
at 10.
34. Cited by Lord Beecham, debate on Civil Proceedings and Family Pro-
ceedings Fees (Amendment) Order 2015 (4 March 2015: Column 312).
35. Pyper and McGuinness, above n. 33, at 3.
36. Beecham, above n. 34.
37. E. Ground and M. Stein, Dealing with Vexatious Employment Tribunal
Litigants, Nabarro LLP, 2013, available at: <http:// www. nabarro. com/
Downloads/ Vexatious_ tribunal_ litigants. pdf> (last accessed, 15 Novem-
ber 2015).
struck out on jurisdictional grounds that would have
encompassed vexatious claims. As such it can, it seems,
properly be said that the reform has produced a reduc-
tion in access to justice.
Given the paucity and criticisms that can be raised in
respect of the evidence base on which the court fee
increase was predicated and the consequences of modest
fees being introduced into the Employment Tribunals,
it is not unreasonable to conclude that there is a real risk
that the civil court fee increases and any introduction of
enhanced fees will produce a similar result to that which
occurred in the Employment Tribunals, if not a more
adverse one. The practical consequence of this set of
austerity-induced reforms might thus be to produce a
serious reduction in and denial of access to civil justice.
At the very least, it is difficult to see the basis for the
assumption that the fee increases will have no such
adverse impact, as noted by Lord Beecham.38 On the
contrary there appears to be a real risk, as the Civil Jus-
tice Council put it, that these reforms will undermine
the principle of equality before the law as the differen-
tial nature of the fee increases can be understood to dis-
proportionately affect litigants of modest means and
small and medium enterprises.39
While the actual effects on the number of claims being
issued and on access to justice remain unclear at June
2015, two more concrete conclusions can be drawn from
civil court fee reform. First, if the fee increase produces
a reduction in claims being issued, the reforms are likely
to be self-defeating. The increases were predicated on
reducing the taxpayer subsidy for the civil justice sys-
tem.40 If claim numbers reduce in the light of fee increa-
ses, the benefits to the taxpayer will either, in whole or
in part, not be realised. This will either result in the
Ministry of Justice having to seek further savings from
the civil justice system to meet its savings targets,
increase fees further thereby compounding the problem,
or continue to subsidise the system. Each potential
alternative would undoubtedly entail further reform of
the system. Given the overall commitment to lowering
public sector spending, the likely choice taken would be
one that saw no further increase in public spending on
the civil courts, which would result in a furthering win-
nowing of the system with an attendant decrease in the
system’s ability to deliver civil justice effectively. Sec-
ondly, the increases, and the fact that they are predica-
ted on eliminating both taxpayer subsidy for the system
and to enable the government to reduce and then elimi-
nate its residual role in funding fee remissions, further
embed the flawed conception of the justice system that
has been in place since the 1980s. It would further
entrench the idea that the civil justice system ought to
be funded by its users because, rather than provide a
public good, it simply provides a consumer service
which, like any other such service, should be paid for by
the user. It may therefore mark a further step along a
38. Beecham, above n. 34.
39. Civil Justice Council, above n. 24, at 2.
40. And consequently the family justice system.
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road towards the separation of the State from the Eng-
lish civil justice system.41
2.2 Civil Legal Aid Reforms – Questioning
Fundamental Aspects of the Civil Justice
System
2.2.1 Civil Legal Aid Reforms
The availability of civil legal aid has been a central fea-
ture of the English civil justice system since it was intro-
duced by the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949. Original-
ly, approximately 80% of the population were eligible
for such an aid in a limited number of categories of
claim. Over the next 50 years, its scope initially grew to
cover more categories of claim while eligibility declined
per head of population. By the late 1990s, 52% of the
population were eligible for civil legal aid. This had
declined to 41% by 2001 following the removal of most
personal injury claims from legal aid cover in 1999.42 By
2007 it stood at 29%.43 In 2010 further reform of the
system was considered.44
The 2010 reform proposals were predicated on two
grounds. First, it was necessary to reduce legal aid
spending because the State continued to spend too
much money on it. As the Lord Chancellor put it, not-
withstanding serial reductions in legal aid cover, Eng-
land and Wales continued to have ‘one of the most
expensive (legal aid systems) in the world, available for a
very wide range of issues, including some which should
not require any legal expertise to resolve’.45 Expenditure
consequently had to be brought under control so as to
ensure that it was only provided for serious, meritorious
cases, for classes of case for which the public interest
required funding to be made available. A too generous
system needed to be brought under control. Secondly,
and in furtherance of the government’s overall plan to
reduce public expenditure, reform was necessary.46 As
the Lord Chancellor explained, ‘Legal aid must also
play its part in fulfilling the Government’s commitment
to reducing the fiscal deficit and returning this coun-
try’s economy to stability and growth.’47
While the government acknowledged that, in its view,
the legal aid system was in need of fundamental reform
notwithstanding the financial crisis, the need for reform
was acute given the financial crisis. The necessity for
reform arose against ‘a backdrop of considerable finan-
41. See further, J. Sorabji, Justice in a Market State – An English Prolegome-
non, in Citizen-State-International Community: A Collection of Studies
(C.H. Beck) (2014); Genn, above n. 13; T. Farrow, Civil Justice, Privati-
zation and Democracy (Toronto) (2014).
42. See Access to Justice Act 1999.
43. See S. Hynes and J. Robins, The Justice Gap (2009) (LAG), at 71 for an
overview of the history of the development of legal aid.
44. Ministry of Justice, Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in England
and Wales (CP7967/2010); further reductions, primarily aimed at
reducing criminal legal aid albeit with some reductions to civil legal aid,
were proposed in 2013, see Ministry of Justice, Transforming Legal Aid:
Delivering a More Credible and Efficient System (CP14/2013).
45. Ministry of Justice (CP7967/2010), at 3.
46. As noted, ibid., at 15.
47. Ibid. and see Ministry of Justice, Reform of Legal Aid in England and
Wales: The Government Response (CM8072/2011), at 3.
cial pressure’. The specific reform proposals were spe-
cifically ‘developed with the aim of providing a substan-
tial contribution to the Ministry of Justice’s target of a
real reduction of 23% in its budget, worth nearly £2bn
in 2014-15’. The proposals were to reduce public spend-
ing by £350 million, which was 17.5% of the required
overall reduction. This reduction in ‘public spending
[was] essential to economic recovery’.48 The reduction
in civil legal aid spending would have thus gone ahead
irrespective of it being, arguably, higher than in other
jurisdictions.
Austerity was thus both the efficient and final cause of
the reforms,49 a conclusion underpinned by the Justice
Minister’s acknowledgment in Parliament, following
their introduction, that the reforms were implemented
on an inadequate evidence-base because ‘the economic
situation that the Government inherited did not allow
that luxury’.50 If austerity had not been the main driver
of reform, time could have been spent on both securing
robust comparative evidence as to civil legal aid spend-
ing in the context of differing approaches to the struc-
ture of civil justice systems and into its potential effects.
That austerity was the main driver justified the actual
approach taken and the lack of evidence gathering.
The civil legal aid reforms, following on from the 2010
consultation, were effected in 2012 by the Legal Aid,
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. It
came into force in April 2013 and reduced civil legal aid
by 40%, such that it stood at £157 million for a popula-
tion of 53.5 million or approximately £3 per head per
annum.51 Consequently, very few types of civil claim
fall within the scope of legal aid. Areas still within
scope, albeit subject to stringent limits, are actions
against the police; clinical negligence; community care;
debt; education; employment; housing; immigration and
asylum inquests; mental health; personal injury, in very
48. Ministry of Justice, above n. 44, at 5 and 15.
49. See, for instance, Ministry of Justice, Transforming Legal Aid: Next
Steps (September 2013), at 3, ‘This Government has embarked upon a
process of repairing the public finances after years of reckless borrowing
and financial crisis under the previous administration. The Ministry of
Justice will see its budget reduce by nearly a third between 2010 and
2016. No area of our spending has been immune from scrutiny in these
circumstances. Our legal aid system is a major part of my Department’s
budget, and it is therefore appropriate that we look to make savings
here too.’ And see Ministry of Justice, Transforming Legal Aid – Next
Steps: Government Response (February 2014), at 6, in which the Minis-
try of Justice noted that the civil legal aid reforms arising from the 2010
consultation did not realise sufficient savings and thus further reduc-
tions, primarily in criminal legal aid expenditure, were necessary.
50. S. Vara M.P. cited in House of Common’s Justice Committee, Impact of
Changes to Civil Legal Aid under Part 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing
and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (HC 311, 2015), at 8.
51. For critical comment see, Low Commission, Tackling the Advice Deficit
– A strategy for Access to Advice and Legal Support on Social Welfare
Law in England and Wales (LAG, 2014), Annex 11 at 1.
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limited circumstances such as claims involving infants;
public law and judicial review; and welfare benefits.52
It was anticipated prior to their introduction that these
reforms would be highly detrimental to effective access
to justice, that they would, as the Civil Justice Council
concluded, ‘have a disproportionately adverse effect on
the most vulnerable in our society’53 and that they
would lead to significant increases in individuals having
to litigate without legal advice or representation (liti-
gants-in-person or LiPs).54 The Civil Justice Council’s
conclusions were based on ‘informed prediction(s)’,
such as those provided by free legal advice and support
agencies based on their experience of increases of indi-
viduals seeking their services following previous reduc-
tions in legal aid provision.55 Evidence regarding the
actual effects of the reforms is, however, thin, primarily
because no data is kept concerning either the rate at
which individuals litigate or the number of LiPs appear-
ing before the civil courts.56 A limited amount of evi-
dence suggests that the predictions have been borne out.
Data shows that, since 2013, there has been a 62% drop
in civil cases that have been granted legal aid funding,57
that in the year 2013-2014, ‘326,004 fewer cases than
would have been expected without the (2012 Act)
reforms’ received civil legal help, i.e., advice funding
and ‘36,537 fewer cases’58 received civil legal representa-
tion funding. The free advice agencies, those that provi-
ded the Civil Justice Council with ‘informed predic-
tions’, have seen significant increases in vulnerable indi-
52. See Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012,
schedule 1. For a discussion of the areas that remain in scope, see V.
Ling and S. Pugh, Legal Aid Handbook 2013-2014 (LAG, 2013), at 25
ff.; Bar Council, Changes to Legal Aid – A Practical Guide, available at:
<http:// www. barcouncil. org. uk/ media/ 201552/ changes_ to_ civil_ legal_
aid_ practical_ guidance_ for_ the_ bar. pdf> (last accessed, 15 November
2015); G. Cookson, Unintended Consequences: The Cost of the Gov-
ernment’s Legal Aid Reforms (2011), available at: <https:// www. kcl. ac.
uk/ campuslife/ student/ news/ stories/ UnintendedConsequences -
FinalReport. pdf> (last accessed, 15 November 2015), at 13.
53. Civil Justice Council, Access to Justice for Litigants in Person (or Self-
Represented Litigants) (2011), at 8.
54. Ibid., at 6-9; R. Lowe, Lord Woolf UK Legal Aid Cuts May Cause
‘extreme’ Psychological Damage, IBA News, 20 March 2013, available
at: <http:// www. ibanet. org/ Article/ Detail. aspx ?ArticleUid= fc020f7e -
ea11 -4895 -8495 -88d876d41c63> (last accessed, 15 November 2015).
55. Ibid., at 8 and 17.
56. As R. Trinder et al., Litigants in Person in Private Family Law Cases
(Ministry of Justice Analytical Series, 2014), at 2, concluded in 2014 it
remained to be seen whether the reforms would ‘lead to a sustained’
increase the numbers of LiPs. Evidence by the Chief Executive of Her
Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, Natalie Ceeney to a Parliament
implied that it has up-to-date records, although they are not apparently
in the public domain, see House of Commons, Justice Committee, evi-
dence session, 13 October 2015.
57. Ministry of Justice Legal Aid Figures, June 2014, available at: <http://
static. guim. co. uk/ sys -images/ Guardian/ Pix/ pictures/ 2014/ 9/ 3/
1409762794943/ Legalaidgraphic. jpg ?guni= Article: in%20body
%20link> (last accessed, 15 November 2015); A. Zuckerman, No Jus-
tice Without Lawyers—The Myth of an Inquisitorial Solution, 33 Civil
Justice Quarterly 355, at 355 (2014). ‘According to Government fig-
ures, 623,000 of the 1 million people who benefited from Legal Aid
annually will be denied access to this aid from April 1, 2013, when the
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 became
effective.’
58. National Audit Office, Implementing Reforms to Civil Legal Aid (HC
784, 2014), at 2.
viduals calling on their services for debt advice, employ-
ment, housing, social security and immigration, and asy-
lum advice and support. The Personal Support Unit,
for instance, reported that it provided free advice and
assistance to nearly 40,000 individuals in 2014-2015 and
in 2015-2016 expects to assist approximately 50,000
individuals seeking such a help. In 2012-2013, the year
before the legal aid reforms were introduced it provid-
ed such assistance to approximately 12-13,000 individu-
als.59 Other evidence shows a variety of adverse conse-
quences of the reforms ranging from a reduction in
numbers seeking such legal support that remains availa-
ble both in terms of individuals seeking legal aid where
it does remain available, due to a failure to appreciate its
true extent, and significant reductions in a variety of
free legal advice services which have themselves lost
funding.60 Unsurprisingly in the circumstances, the
House of Commons’ Justice Committee concluded the
reforms harmed access to justice.61
The most significant noticeable impact on the civil
courts arising from the legal aid reforms has, however,
concerned LiPs. The expectation that the reforms
would lead to a significant increase in LiPs appears to
have been borne out. As the Justice Committee conclu-
ded in the light of a wide range of evidence presented to
it,
…there has been a significant rise in the number of
self-represented litigants (LiPs) before the courts but
even approximate numbers are difficult to determine.
Figures for litigants in person are not collated in the
civil courts, but the Master of the Rolls, Lord Dyson,
told us that the civil courts had experienced a signifi-
cant impact from a rise in litigants in person.62
59. The Personal Support Unit, Annual Report 2014-2015 (2015), at 3.
60. See, for instance, the Low Commission Report and House of Common’s
Justice Committee (HC 311, 2015).
61. House of Common’s Justice Committee (HC 311, 2015), at 3.
62. House of Common’s Justice Committee (HC 311, 2015) at 36, noting
evidence from Lord Dyson MR, head of civil justice, and drawing on
comparative evidence from the family justice system, which showed
‘strongly suggests not only a significant increase in parties without legal
representation but also that litigants in person may be appearing in
more complicated cases or be less able to represent themselves’ and
Judicial Executive Board, Written Evidence – Justice Committee Inquiry:
Impact of Changes to Civil Legal aid under the LEGAL AID, Sentencing
and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (2014); Civil Justice Council,
Civil Justice Council Response to Justice Committee Inquiry: Impact of
Changes to Civil Legal aid under the Legal Aid, Sentencing & Punish-
ment of Offenders (LASPO)Act 2012 (2014), ‘The escalating cost of
using lawyers in civil litigation in circumstances where legal aid has nev-
er been available has coincided with the major legal aid reforms under
the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LAS-
PO) which took effect in April 2013. This has resulted in a very signifi-
cant rise in the proportion of litigants in person.’ And see, Q v. Q
[2014] EWFC 31 at [11]; Bar Council, The Legal Aid, Sentencing and
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO): One Year On – Final
Report (2014), at 29.
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The Lord Chief Justice’s Annual Report 2014 reiterated
the point,63 as did a survey conducted by Cookson on
behalf of the Bar Council.64 This increase in LiPs has
led to a number of fundamental aspects of the English
approach to civil justice being questioned, alternative
approaches being proposed and, in some cases, being
introduced. It is this that is producing what is likely to
be the most far-reaching consequence of austerity on the
civil justice system.65 The following section considers
those issues and approaches.
2.2.2 Questioning the Fundamentals
The increase in LiPs has produced two significant areas
of reform: the first concerns the English civil justice sys-
tem’s commitment to adversarial process; the second
has seen a rise in the use of non-legally qualified indi-
viduals as advocates contrary to the traditional approach
that strictly regulates such rights.
2.2.2.1 Inquisitoriality
The English civil justice system is primarily
adversarial.66 It has traditionally been characterised by a
passive judiciary who ensured that procedural rules
were observed and determined claims based on the law
and on evidence submitted by the parties. Responsibility
for case progression to trial, gathering, submitting, and
testing evidence was that of the parties. The Woolf
reforms of the late 1990s effected a significant change to
one aspect of this traditional approach through the
introduction of active court-based case management.
Since 1999, the court, rather than the parties, has been
responsible for ensuring cases progress to trial economi-
cally and efficiently.67 Parties are under a duty to assist
the court carry out this duty.68 This reform, however,
left the fundamental structure of the adversarial process
untouched. It did not, for instance, provide judges with
any power to gather evidence. Nor did it permit judges
to test witness evidence69 or require of the court’s own
motion the production of documentary evidence that
the parties had for whatever reason not adduced at
trial.70 While it removed one aspect of the adversarial
system – party autonomy over case progression – it left
the remainder untouched. Case management powers did
63. The Lord Chief Justice’s Annual Report (2014), at 12, ‘The escalating
cost of using lawyers in civil litigation in circumstances where legal aid
has never been available has coincided with the major legal aid reforms
under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012
(LASPO) which took effect in April 2013. This has resulted in a very sig-
nificant rise in the proportion of litigants in person.’
64. Bar Council, above n. 62, at 67.
65. An overview of the issues can be found in UCL Judicial Institute, Liti-
gants in Person: What Can Courts Do? – Background Papers (2014).
66. Although see, A. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Inheritance, 90 Cornell Law
Review 1181 (2004–2005).
67. CPR rr.1 and 3.
68. CPR r.1.3.
69. Jones v. National Coal Board [1957] 2 Q.B. 55 at 64; Southwark Lon-
don Borough Council v. Kofi-Adu [2006] EWCA Civ 281; [2006] H.L.R.
33, at [148].
70. Air Canada v. Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 A.C. 394, at 439
‘There is no independent power in the court to say that, nevertheless, it
would like to inspect the documents, with a view to possible produc-
tion, for its own assistance.’
not thus equate to, or provide, investigative or inquisito-
rial powers; a point highlighted by Lord Dyson JSC in
Al Rawi v. The Security Service in 2012. Discussing the
extent of the court’s power to regulate its own process,
he noted that it was, ‘surely not in doubt that a court
cannot conduct a trial inquisitorially rather than by
means of an adversarial process (at any rate, not without
the consent of the parties)’.71
The increase in LiPs as a consequence of austerity has
called into question the commitment to adversarial pro-
cess: it has raised the very doubt Lord Dyson JSC
thought to be beyond question. It has done so because,
as Lord Thomas CJ put it in evidence to Parliament, the
adversarial system cannot work without legal aid, i.e.,
without the provision of funding for legal representa-
tives.72 Party autonomy, and its converse judicial passiv-
ity, in framing and controlling the substantive content
of the litigation, in investigating the issues, securing and
testing relevant evidence, as well as ensuring effective
navigation of relevant procedural rules and compliance
with procedural obligations is predicated on the pres-
ence of lawyers.73 In the absence of lawyers, the court is
faced with a dilemma: either take on the lawyers’ role in
addition to its adjudicatory role or, potentially, fail to
discharge its duty as a court of law to provide a fair trial.
As Ryder LJ explained it, in the context of family pro-
ceedings in C (a child), following a failure by two LiPs
to secure and submit appropriate evidence and informa-
tion in advance of a hearing so that central issues in the
claim were neither identified nor answered at the hear-
ing,
Appointments of the type I have so far been describ-
ing take time, particularly where one or more of the
parties are litigants in person as a consequence of the
provisions of LASPO 2012. If the dispute is not
immediately susceptible of conciliation or out of
court mediation it will require a lawyer’s analysis.
This is after all a court of law. In the absence of law-
yers, the judge has to do that and to do that without
assistance and sometimes with quite vocal hindrance.
That requires more time than in a circumstance
where the lawyers can be required to apply the rules
and practice directions, produce the witness state-
ments, summaries, analyses and schedules, obtain
instructions and protect their lay client’s interests.
Where a court is faced with litigants in person the
judge has to do all that while maintaining both the
reality and perception of fairness and due process.74
Similar problems have been identified in civil claims.
Tugendhat J in Mole v. Hunter, for instance, explained
that in the absence of legal representatives the court had
71. [2012] 1 A.C. 531 at 22.
72. Lord Thomas CJ, Unrevised Transcript of Evidence Taken before the
Select Committee on the Constitution (House of Lords, 7 May 2014),
at 15.
73. See, for instance, Tinkler v. Elliott [2012] EWCA Civ 1289, in which a
failure to appreciate the process for challenging a decision led to a
claimant being unable to do so effectively.
74. [2013] EWCA Civ 1412 at [40].
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to adopt an essentially investigative approach.75 He did
so by consent of the parties, albeit this was in his view
unnecessary, as the court’s case management powers
provided the jurisdiction for such an approach to be tak-
en (see CPR r.3.1(2)(m)).76 His approach also required
the court to question the parties to ascertain the nature
of the dispute, to place the parties’ case papers in an
appropriate order, to carry out preparatory work that
would otherwise be carried out by lawyers, particularly
by junior lawyers. It had to do so ‘in order for the case is
to be tried justly’.77
Necessity, in the absence of lawyers, has therefore
meant that courts have had no choice but to carry out
administrative functions ordinarily the province by law-
yers. More significantly however, as the two cases cited
demonstrate, they have had to start to move away from
the traditional, adversarial, idea that the judge should
play no part in evidence-gathering, issue identification,
or in examining parties or witnesses at trial. While such
a move to a substantively quasi-inquisitorial (in the
sense that a fully inquisitorial process would be one that
enabled the court to initiate proceedings) was initially
mooted as an idea that needed consideration by, for
instance, a Judicial Working Party on LiPs in 201378 and
then by the Lord Chief Justice in 2014,79 the pace of
change has been faster than might have been expected
for such a significant shift in approach. Reform has been
implemented in two distinct ways.
The first change, which partially outran the calls for
considered reform, encompasses the change in practice
in the courts already outlined. It goes wider than this
though. The judiciary has not simply started to develop
more inquisitorial practices; it has taken an active role in
reforming the justice system by developing a number of
measures to assist LiPs. It has been instrumental in the
establishment of pro bono legal advice and assistance
schemes in the High Court. Such schemes are operated
by the legal profession and seek to facilitate the provi-
sion of such assistance and, in some cases representation
in court, by junior or trainee lawyers.80 The judiciary
has also devised a number of legal practice guides,
aimed at giving LiPs straightforward guidance on court
75. [2014] EWHC 658 (QB) at [107]-[119]; also see, for instance, Re R (a
child) [2014] EWCA Civ 597 at [3].
76. It provides that the court may ‘take any other step or make any other
order for the purpose of managing the case and furthering the overrid-
ing objective’.
77. Ibid., at [111]. As he noted, the use of an expensive resource – the judi-
cial – to carry out a role normally played by junior lawyers was a false
economy both in terms of time and money. At the present time it does
not appear that this transfer of work from the legal profession to the
courts would cause a significant drag on court resources does not
appear to have been borne out, see Ministry of Justice, Government
Response to Justice Committee’s Eighth Report of Session 2014-15
(2015), at 3.
78. Report of the Judicial Working Group on Litigants in Person (Judicial
Office) (2013), which was established to consider how to adapt the civil
justice system to enable it to manage claims effectively for LiPs.
79. J. Thomas, Reshaping Justice (Justice Lecture) (3 March 2014), at [29]-
[32].
80. E.g., The Chancery Bar Litigant-in-Person Scheme.
and trial procedure.81 There has also been an increased
emphasis on revising court forms to render them more
comprehensible to individuals who have had no legal
training.
The second change concerns the rules of court. In its
report from 2013, the Judicial Working Party on LiPs
identified three modifications to the CPR that could be
made. It recommended, where one or more parties to
claim was a LiP, that: (i) a dedicated rule be introduced
that made ‘specific modifications to other (procedural)
rules’;82 (ii) a new case management power to provide
for an inquisitorial process be introduced; and/or (iii) a
new provision that provided for a fully inquisitorial pro-
cess be introduced.83 While it has been acknowledged,
as previously noted by Tugendhat J in Mole v. Hunter,
that CPR r.3.1(2)(m) provides sufficient power to ach-
ieve what the recommendations sought to effect, they
have been acted on. From October 2015, in order to
emphasise the requirement that the courts adapt and use
the wide powers that the rules of court already provide
to them, a discrete rule (CPR r.3.1A) is to be introduced
into the CPR.84 This will implement the first and sec-
ond of the three recommendations and will, amongst
other things, require the court to ‘adopt such procedure
at the hearing as it considers appropriate to further the
overriding objective’, to adapt case management direc-
tions as necessary, and, as an exception to the general
approach to evidence provided by CPR rr.32 and 33, to
ascertain the nature of relevant witness evidence and
where necessary question witnesses. The idea that the
court can generally adapt its process to be inquisitorial
or investigative is thus to become a formal aspect of its
powers. The idea, expressed by Lord Dyson JSC, that
the civil process cannot be carried out inquisitorially is
no longer one that holds true.
In addition to these reforms Justice, a law reform body,
has recently proposed an even greater embrace of
inquisitorial techniques. In its research paper, Delivering
Justice in an Age of Austerity,85 it set out a detailed pro-
posal for fundamental reform of the civil justice system.
Its proposal is an updated version of Professor Sander’s
multi-door courthouse model developed in the 1970s.86
Its recommendations are explicitly made on the basis
that the justice system has been placed under acute
pressure through a combination of legal aid cuts and a
sharp reduction in public spending on the courts. It
understands these austerity measures to have made it
81. See, for instance, Civil Justice Council, A Guide to Bringing and Defend-
ing a Small Claim (2013); Judicial Office, The Interim Applications
Court of the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court – A Guide for
Litigants in Person (2013); H.H.J. Bailey et al., A Handbook for Litigants
in Person (2013).
82. See J. Sorabji, Promptly Setting Aside a Judgment Given in a Party’s
Absence: Tinkler v. Elliot, 32 Civil Justice Quarterly 9 at 13 (2013).
83. Report of the Judicial Working Group on Litigants in Person Report at
24.
84. Civil Justice Council, Helping Litigants in Person Prepare for Court (July
2015).
85. Justice, Delivering Justice in an Age of Austerity – A Report (2015).
86. F. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 Federal Rules Decisions,
79, 111 (1976).
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increasingly difficult for litigants, increasingly unrepre-
sented, to ‘navigate (the) adversarial justice system’.87 In
order to remedy this access to justice deficit, its primary
recommendation is the introduction of a legally quali-
fied court officer (a Registrar) who, while not a judge,
would be responsible for managing claims once they
were issued. Such officers would be required to clarify
the issues in dispute, determine what evidence is
required and direct the parties to submit it, review the
evidence and, in the light of that review, determine the
appropriate means of resolving the dispute, i.e., through
striking it out, carrying out an early neutral evaluation,
directing it to mediation or transferring it to a judge for
adjudication.88
It is, at this time, not apparent whether and if so to what
extent the Justice report may be acted upon. Implemen-
tation of its proposals will require a significant restruc-
turing of the civil courts and judiciary and will, through
the employment and training of sufficient number of
Registrars, undoubtedly be an expensive exercise even if
only in the short term. Given the potential expense, it is
perhaps unlikely that its recommendations will be
implemented in full. As elements of the Report cohere
with other developments already being introduced, as
noted above, it is likely that at least some of its recom-
mendations will be introduced. The role of the Registrar
could, for instance, be adapted so that existing proce-
dural judges carry it out with the assistance of such law-
yers as the court service already employs. This would
consequently increase the level at which the court car-
ried out an active investigation into the issues in dis-
pute, helped the parties to identify and refine them, and
played an active role in identifying evidence and requir-
ing its submission to the court. At the very least it pro-
vides a basis upon which the judiciary could consider
how to further develop the more inquisitorial
approaches to the conduct of litigation that they have
developed, noted above. Moreover it shows quite clearly
that, along with those judicial developments, an idea
that was rejected out of hand in the 1950s89 – that the
English civil justice system could adopt a more inquisi-
torial approach – is now moving into the mainstream
both in terms of actual practice and further, future
reform.
2.2.2.2 McKenzie Friends
The reduction in civil legal aid has had one further spe-
cific consequence. It has resulted in increasing numbers
of LiPs obtaining the help of individuals who, although
not qualified or regulated lawyers, provide legal assis-
tance. Historically such individuals, colloquially known
as McKenzie Friends, have provided moral support and
assistance to LiPs as part of every litigant’s common law
right to receive reasonable assistance in the prosecution
87. Justice, above 85, at 1.
88. Ibid., at 20-25.
89. The Committee on Committee on Supreme Court Practice and Proce-
dure, Final Report (Cmd 8878, 1953) at [25]-[26].
of litigation.90 Over the last 20 years, and most acutely
since the 2012 legal aid reforms came into effect,
increasing numbers of individuals have provided such
support and, where authorised by the court on a case-
by-case basis to do so, acted as advocates for LiPs in
court.91 Increasingly, such McKenzie Friends, have and
are marketing themselves as ‘professional’ and charging
for their services.
While the provision of legal advice is not restricted to
lawyers, generally speaking the exercise of rights of
audience in courts is regulated and restricted to
lawyers.92 In order to improve access to justice there has
been a tendency, since 2013, in both the family and civil
courts to take a more lenient approach to the grant of
advocacy rights to McKenzie Friends by the courts.
Faced with an increase in LiPs who are unfamiliar with
court procedure, who may be nervous of addressing the
court or may not be in a position to question witnesses
or present evidence, the availability of a McKenzie
Friend who may, and in some cases will, be able to pres-
ent the litigant’s case more effectively, the courts have
begun to take a more liberal approach to the grant of
such rights than is strictly permissible.93 This approach,
allied to increasing demand as lawyers become increas-
ingly unaffordable following the removal of legal aid,
has led to increasing numbers of unregulated ‘professio-
nal’ fee-charging McKenzie Friends. It has also led to
calls for the courts to take an even more accommodating
approach to them and to granting them rights of audi-
ence, such that they become an accepted part of the jus-
tice system.94
Unlike those developments relating to inquisitorial pro-
cesses, which have been broadly welcomed,95 these
developments and the prospect of increased use of
McKenzie Friends, particularly fee-paid ones, have met
with a degree of concern, particularly from the legal
profession.96 These concerns fall into two categories.
First, there are practical concerns stemming from the
fact that McKenzie Friends need not have any legal
training, that they owe no duty to the court and may not
properly understand or apply applicable duties of confi-
dentiality or come within the protection afforded by way
of legal professional privilege. Furthermore concerns
arise because they are not subject to any form of profes-
sional regulation, discipline, or requirements to hold
professional indemnity insurance. The quality of their
assistance may thus be variable, more variable than a
90. R v. Leicester City Justices, ex parte Barrow [1991] 260 at 289; McKen-
zie v. McKenzie [1970] 3 W.L.R. 472.
91. For a discussion, see Report of the Judicial Working Group on Litigants
in Person (2013), at 26 ff.
92. Legal Services Act 2007.
93. The test for the grant of such rights is summarised in: Practice Guidance
(McKenzie Friends: Civil and Family Courts) [2010] 1 W.L.R. 1881.
94. Legal Services Consumer Panel, Report: Fee-Charging McKenzie Friends
(2014).
95. Although for criticism of this development, see Zuckerman, above n.
57, at 355.
96. See, for instance, C. Smith, McKenzie Friends Rebuff from Bar, Law
Gazette (20 July 2015) noting the Bar Council’s concerns.
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lawyer, without the protection afforded to individuals
who instruct lawyers.
Secondly, there is a more principled objection to any
increased use or legitimatisation of McKenzie Friends.
Increasing legitimisation is implicitly predicated on an
acceptance of the fact that should an individual not be
able to afford a lawyer anybody else, irrespective of their
ability or training, will do. If made in respect of medical
provision, it is an idea that would be rejected out of
hand. If it were suggested, for instance, that the Nation-
al Health Service was to ration availability of free-at-
the-point-of-delivery operations but that those who
were to pay for their operations but could not afford to
do so could use McKenzie Friends to operate on them,
the idea would be viewed as completely unacceptable. It
would consign the impecunious to a second-class status,
and one that saw them resorting to the untrained and
unregulated to perform surgery.
The suggestion that those who cannot afford lawyers
should be permitted to resort to untrained individuals
because that is the best on offer is a counsel of despair.
It is one that cannot properly have any place in a society
that claims to provide substantive rather than merely
formal equality before the law and equal access to jus-
tice. It is, perhaps, the most significant adverse conse-
quence of austerity-induced cuts to civil legal. It is one
that the growth of an inquisitorial approach by the
courts and the promotion of pro bono legal advice and
assistance, as promoted by the courts and the legal pro-
fession, may however counteract. If they, or other meas-
ures such as the promotion of replacements for civil
legal aid such as the development of legal expenses
insurance as has occurred in Canada,97 do not prevail
there is a real risk that the growth of fee-paid McKenzie
Friends of varying quality and ability will pose a signifi-
cant problem for the proper administration of justice for
individuals who can ill-afford poor representation and
may embed substantive inequality before the law into
the justice system. It will make the provision of second-
class justice an accepted part of the civil justice system.
3 Small Claims and Small
Claims Mediation
Having reviewed a number of developments to the Eng-
lish civil justice system that have arisen as a conse-
quence of austerity, this article now turns to consider an
area where austerity might have produced reform: the
English small claims procedure and small claims media-
tion. These are two areas that have undergone recent
reforms, ones that coincided with austerity. This section
is divided into two parts. The first provides an outline
of the two processes. The second considers what effect
austerity may have had on their development and con-
97. Canadian Bar Association, Reaching Equal Justice: An Invitation to
Envision and Act (Report of the CBA Access to Justice Committee,
2013), at 101 ff.
cludes that ultimately any reform to the processes could
not have met the problems arising from the changes
effected to court fees and civil legal aid.
3.1 The Small Claims Track and Small Claims
Mediation
3.1.1 Small Claims
The small claims procedure, sometimes incorrectly
referred to as the small claims court, originated in 1973
as an extension of the County Courts’98 power to direct
a small claim to arbitration.99 It was originally intended
to provide, ‘an accessible, quick, cheap and informal
means of deciding disputed civil claims which
involve(d) comparatively small sums of money’.100 The
process was reformed as part of the Woolf reforms101
and formalised in CPR Pt 27 as one of English civil pro-
cedure’s three procedural case tracks.102 It is designed to
provide a speedy, low cost, proportionate process for
managing and determining claims of low value. The vast
majority of civil claims are small claims,103 with, for
instance, over 80% of all personal injury claims being
allocated to it.104 It is a highly successful aspect of the
civil process, benefiting from a high degree of user-sat-
isfaction.105
The small claims procedure has a number of features
that distinguish it from English civil procedure general-
ly. It applies to all claims whose value is below £10,000
and to those personal injury claims and housing claims
whose value is below £1,000.106 Other claims may be
allocated to it consistently with the CPR’s overriding
objective of dealing with cases justly and at proportion-
ate costs. Given that it is designed for the use of litigants
without resort to lawyers it has two defining features.
98. NB: until 2013 each of the approximately 216 County Courts through-
out England and Wales was a separate, distinct, court. In 2013, as a
consequence of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders
Act 2012, the County Courts were merged into a single, England and
Wales-wide, County Court.
99. H. Woolf, Access to Justice: Interim Report to the Lord Chancellor on
the Civil Justice System in England and Wales (HMSO) (1995), at 102;
and see, N. Andrews, Andrews on Civil Processes (2013), Vol. 1 at 94;
County Courts Act 1959, s92 (as amended by the Administration of
Justice Act 1977, s17); see further CCR Ord. 19, r.5 in R. Gregory (ed.),
The County Court Practice 1983 (1983); CCR ord. 19, rr.1-10 in P.
Thompson (ed.), The County Court Practice 1994 (1994).
100. Report of the Review Body on Civil Justice (Cmd 394 of 1988) cited in
Woolf, above n. 99, at 104.
101. Woolf, above n. 99; H. Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report to the
Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales
(HMSO) (1996).
102. The other two tracks are the fast track (CPR Pt 28), which applies to
claims with a value of above £10,000 and below £25,000; and the mul-
ti-track (CPR Pt 29), which applies to all other claims.
103. See R. Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Preliminary Report
(2009), Vol. 1 at 47.
104. Ibid., at 108.
105. L. Bello, Small Claims, Big Claims – Consumers’ Perceptions of the
Small Claims Process (Consumer Focus, 2010), at 4 and 17. Also see
Jackson, above n. 103, at 119; IFF Research, Consumer Experience of
the Small Claims Process – Research Report (2010).
106. CPR r.27.1(2) & r.63.27.
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First, unlike civil procedure generally, rights of audi-
ence are unrestricted.107 Litigants may represent them-
selves before the court. They may also be represented
by anybody of their choosing irrespective of their legal
knowledge and experience or lack thereof. Secondly,
and necessarily linked to the previous point, the court’s
traditional commitment to an adversarial process is sub-
stantially relaxed. District judges, who conduct the
small claims process and trials, can be and generally do
take a far more investigative, inquisitorial approach to
the conduct of hearings. They do so as they are express-
ly authorised to ‘adopt any method of proceeding at a
hearing that [they consider] to be fair…’.108 According-
ly, and reflecting the fact that litigants or their lay repre-
sentatives may have little experience of conducting civil
proceedings and particularly trials, District judges will,
for instance, question witnesses and the parties and
direct the provision of such evidence as they conclude is
appropriate.109
Procedural flexibility is further promoted through the
express exclusion from the small claims process of, for
instance, the otherwise applicable rules of evidence,
rules governing disclosure, and expert evidence.110 Par-
ties need not give evidence on oath. They need only dis-
close those documents they intend to rely upon at trial.
(The normal rule requires parties to disclose documents
adverse to their case or supportive of their opponent’s
case.) Expert evidence is not generally permitted.111
The court can and will often curtail cross-examination;
the judge will ordinarily carry out the examination of
the parties and witnesses. Trials are informal and gener-
ally take place before the District judge in their office
rather than in a formal courtroom.112 The general
expectation is that a trial will last no more than an hour,
although some will last for up to 3 hours. Short, rea-
soned judgements are given and decisions are capable of
appeal. Finally, in contrast to English procedure gener-
ally, the cost-shifting rule is disapplied. Except in cases
where the court determines that one of the parties has
conducted the litigation in an unreasonable manner, in
which case it can award such costs as it assesses summa-
rily,113 the recoverable costs of a small claim and any
appeal114 are, generally, restricted to any court fees paid
by the successful party; fixed legal costs, such as those
for issuing the claim;115 and any witness expenses, sub-
ject to a maximum of £90.116 Lawyer’s fees are not
recoverable.
107. Legal Services Act 2007, Pt 3; The Lay Representatives (Rights of Audi-
ence) Order 1999; CPR PD 27 para. 3.1.
108. CPR 27.8, PD 27 para. 4.3.
109. CPR r.27.2(3).
110. CPR r.27.2(1).
111. General guidance is given to litigants in terms of information generally
needed in small claims proceedings in CPR PD 27 Appendix A; standard
directions are set out at CPR PD 27 Appendix B and C.
112. CPR r.27.8.
113. CPR 27.14(2)(g).
114. CPR r.27.14(2).
115. See CPR r.27.14(2) and CPR r.45.
116. Further fixed costs in specific types of case, i.e., injunctions or certain
road traffic accident cases are also recoverable: see CPR r.27.14 and PD
27 para. 7.
3.1.2 Small Claims Mediation
The small claims procedure has since the CPR was
introduced been a part of the civil process. It culmi-
nates, unless the parties abandon their claim or defence
or settle their dispute consensually, in a reasoned judge-
ment. Its origins were, however, different. As originally
conceived the small claims process was not formally part
of the civil process. It was an arbitral process.117 While
the CPR’s introduction formalised small claims arbitra-
tion as a small claims process, it also effected an
increased emphasis on the use of mediation and other
forms of alternative dispute resolution generally.118
Additionally, a number of pilot schemes, which promo-
ted the use of court-annexed mediation, were intro-
duced both before and after the CPR was brought into
force in 1999.119 The majority of these schemes were
introduced in the County Courts. The schemes worked
broadly in the same way as the original small claims
arbitration had, although as each scheme was a local ini-
tiative they differed in exact practice. As explained by
Prince, they were ‘effectively time-limited mediation,
administered by courts, but conducted by private medi-
ators, who had been accredited and training by media-
tion organizations, approved by the court organizers of
the scheme’.120 If the claim did not then settle, it would
return to the court for adjudication.121 In 2005, the
Department of Constitutional Affairs, having conducted
a study of three such mediation schemes, replaced the
local schemes with a national one.
The new, national, scheme had two features: first, a
National Mediation Helpline (NMH); and secondly, a
Small Claims Mediation Service (SCMS). The former
provided ‘a central resource, whereby parties and their
representatives could be referred to a rota of mediators
based throughout the country…Cases could be referred
to the NMH by the courts, or via self-referral by con-
tacting the NMH on a local rate telephone number’.122
The Civil Mediation Online Directory replaced it in
2011,123 albeit it provides the same basic service, i.e.,
referral to a private mediator. The one central difference
between the online scheme and its predecessor is that
the latter is self-referral only.124 The SCMS, which was
introduced in 2007, provides a free mediation service for
defended small claims. Mediators employed by Her
Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, i.e., civil serv-
117. Woolf, above n. 99, at 102, ‘The small claims procedure has been pro-
gressively refined over the 20 years since it was first introduced in
1973…The first scheme built on an existing statutory procedure which
allowed a county court judge to refer cases to arbitration with the con-
sent of the parties’.
118. Effected through the Civil Procedure Pre-Action Protocols and through
CPR r.1.4(2)(e).
119. See Genn, above n. 13, at 97 (for a summary of the studies of the vari-
ous schemes) and at 105-113; S. Prince, ADR after the CPR, in D.
Dwyer (ed.), The Civil Procedure Rules Ten Years On (2009).
120. Ibid., at 330.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid.
123. See <http:// www. civilmediation. justice. gov. uk> (last accessed, 15
November 2015).
124. See S. Blake, J. Browne & S. Sime, The Jackson ADR Handbook (OUP)
(2013), at 196-97 for an outline of the scheme.
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ants, carry out the mediations, a large number of which
are conducted over the telephone.125 Within its first
year of operation 7,725 small claims were referred to
mediation.126 During 2010 and 2012 this had risen to
more than 15,000127 referrals with a 73% settlement
rate.128
3.2 Austerity’s Effect on Simplified Process
Increasing austerity could potentially have had a num-
ber of effects on both the small claims process and small
claims mediation. The following sections consider two
types of reform that have recently been introduced that
could have been, but were not, a response to austerity. It
also outlines one potential future reform that is, to a cer-
tain extent, predicated on the consequences of austerity.
3.2.1 Increasing the Small Claims Limit and the
Promotion of Small Claims Mediation
The small claims limit has changed a number of times
since its inception. It originally stood at £100 in 1973,
rising to £1,000 in 1991, and then to £3,000 in 1996.
With the CPRs’ introduction in 1999 it was increased to
£5,000.129 In 2013 the limit was increased to £10,000.130
In addition to this the small claims track’s scope was
widened. From its introduction in 1999 it had been pos-
sible for higher-value claims to be allocated to it with
the consent of the parties. This provision was rarely
used. In 2013 the requirement for party consent was
removed, thus enabling the court to allocate suitable
higher-value claims to the small claims track.131
The small claims mediation service has also been subject
to post-austerity reform. In 2012 the CPR introduced a
pilot scheme that provided for automatic referral for
claims below £5,000 in value to the small claims media-
tion service; thus replicating the automatic referral to
small claims arbitration that was in place prior to the
Woolf reforms.132 As Blake et al. noted this did not
transform the scheme into ‘compulsory mediation’. It
simply introduced a ‘mandatory requirement to engage
with a small claims mediator’.133 The mediator, via a tel-
ephone conference, does no more than provide the par-
ties with information about mediation and its benefits.
125. Ibid., at 193; Prince, above n. 122, at 334-39; Ministry of Justice, Solv-
ing Disputes in the County Courts: Creating a Simpler, Quicker and
More Proportionate System, CP6/2011, at 43-44. By 2011 96% of
such mediations were conducted over the telephone.
126. Prince, above n. 119, at 335.
127. Blake et al., above n. 124, at 193 citing Ministry of Justice, Solving Dis-
putes in the County Courts: Creating a Simpler, Quicker and More Pro-
portionate System – A Consultation on Reforming Civil Justice in Eng-
land and Wales – The Government Response (CM 8274, 2012).
128. Ministry of Justice (CP6/2011), at 44.
129. R. Scott (ed.), Civil Procedure (1999) (1999), at 260.
130. Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2013, Art. 9 (SI 2013/262). The
limit for personal injury claims remains, however, at its historic limit of
£1,000.
131. CPR r.26.7(4) originally required party consent. This was revoked by
Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2013, Art. 8. The power to allocate
high value claims to the small claims track is now governed solely by
CPR r.26.7(3). See R. Jackson (ed.), Civil Procedure 2015 (2015), Vol. 1
at 26.7.1.
132. CPR PD 51H (The Mediation Service Pilot Scheme) (CPR PD 59th
Update, 2012).
133. Blake et al., above n. 124, at 193, and see 194.
Should the parties choose to do so the mediator could
then arrange to conduct a telephone-based mediation
free of charge. No adverse consequences flow from a
refusal to mediate. Following a further pilot scheme,
which ran from 2013 to 2014, automatic referral of
claims was formally introduced into the CPR in April
2014.134
Both the reforms to the small claims track and small
claims mediation could have been necessitated by aus-
terity. If, for instance, austerity had resulted in a reduc-
tion in judicial numbers, an increase in the use of medi-
ation could have been promoted to produce a compara-
ble reduction in the number of small claims, thereby
easing what would otherwise have been increasing pres-
sure on judicial workloads. Equally, it could have been
promoted in the light of reductions in staffing levels in
the court administration, again in order to reduce what
would otherwise have been increasing workload pres-
sure. Austerity has not, as yet, resulted in a reduction in
judicial numbers. It has, however, resulted in a signifi-
cant reduction in the number of court staff.135 That has
been achieved through structural reforms to administra-
tive processes such that, according to Her Majesty’s
Courts and Tribunals Service ‘…performance has been
maintained…’.136 While a decline in performance or an
inability to maintain performance levels as a conse-
quence of judicial and staff reductions could, in princi-
ple, have formed a basis for structural reform to the
small claims track such that more claims were diverted
to small claims mediation, the absence of any austerity-
induced adverse effects on judicial numbers or adminis-
trative efficiency means they have not been an factor in
reform.
Secondly, increasing the small claims limit and remov-
ing the need for party consent to allocate high value
claims to the small claims track could have been effected
if there had, for instance, been an increase in claims as a
consequence of austerity. Increasing the number of
claims dealt with on this track could have increased
court efficiency, through ensuring that more claims are
dealt with through its quicker, simplified process and
through referral to mediation. Any increase in caseload
caused by austerity could thus have been more readily
dealt with, albeit at a cost to the quality of justice due to
the more limited process available on the small claims
track. Given the CPR’s overriding objective, and its
commitment to ensuring that all cases are dealt with
justly whilst taking account of, amongst other things,
the need to ration the courts’ resources across all liti-
gants,137 such a potential reduction in quality in order to
promote effective resource use would not have been
134. See CPR PD51I (The Second Mediation Service Pilot Scheme) (CPR PD
61st Update, 2013) and CPR r.26.4A (as introduced in April 2014, Civil
Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2014).
135. HM Courts & Tribunals Service, Annual Report and Accounts
2012-2013, at 10, explained that ‘The 2010 Spending Review (SR10)
set a staff reduction target for HM Courts & Tribunals Service of 2,980.
This equates to circa £107million saving in base line salaries per financial
year from 2013-14.’
136. Ibid., at 10.
137. CPR r.1; J. Sorabji, English Civil Justice after Woolf and Jackson (2014).
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impermissible. On the contrary, it would have been con-
sistent with the philosophical approach underpinning
the CPR.
There was and is, however, no evidence to suggest an
austerity-induced increase in litigation in general or
small claims litigation in particular. On the contrary, the
evidence shows that since 2007 there has been a reduc-
tion in small claims. By way of example, in 2007 the
annual number of small claims that proceeded to trial
was 53,248. This figure has declined in each subsequent
year. By 2013 it stood at almost half the 2007 figure:
22,118.138 These figures are consistent with a general
trend across civil litigation. Available government statis-
tics show a consistent fall in new civil claims being
issued and hearings over the period from 2007 to
2014.139 Given this it cannot properly be said that aus-
terity could have created sufficient pressure, through
increasing claiming rates to have required a reconsidera-
tion and reform of the small claims and small claims
mediation procedures, to justify or require reform to
enable greater diversion of higher level claims to those
processes.140
While, as noted above, it is possible to envisage circum-
stances where austerity could have given rise to the
present reforms to the small claims process, the actual
impetus for both sets of reforms was independent of it.
The initial recommendations for both reforms arose
from a government consultation issued in 2011. Their
aim was to simplify civil process, reduce the cost of liti-
gation, and further embed the principle that litigation
should be a course of last resort.141 The consultation
formed one aspect of a wider reform agenda, which
aimed to implement recommendations made by Sir
Rupert Jackson’s inquiry into the costs of English civil
litigation from 2007 to 2009.142 That agenda under-
stood, consistently with the Woolf reforms of the late
1990s, the primary philosophy of the civil justice system
to be the promotion of settlement.143 It also required the
creation and effective operation of proportionate pro-
cesses that matched the nature of the civil process to,
primarily, the value of the claim so as to render the cost
138. See Court Statistics, Main Tables, available at: <https:// www. gov. uk/
government/ statistics/ court -statistics -quarterly -april -to -june -2014>
(last accessed, 15 November 2015).
139. Court Statistics show a consistent fall of new civil cases and hearings,
see Ministry of Justice, Court Statistics Quarterly (January-March
2013), (April-June 2013), (July-September 2013), (October-December
2013), (January-March 2014), (April-June 2014). The figures for the
2013 periods are, respectively: a reduction against the equivalent period
in 2007 of 26% and 38%, 26% and 38%, 26% and 41%, 12% and
37% (as against the same period in 2009). For the 2014 periods, the
first saw an increase in both figures of 13% as against the final quarter
in 2013, while the second saw a return to reduction in court work, with
a 13% reduction in new cases and a 6% reduction in hearings as
against the previous quarter.
140. For a similar analysis in respect of the United States, see R. Marcus, Pro-
cedure in a Time of Austerity, International Journal of Procedural Law
(2013), at 133.
141. Ministry of Justice (CP6/2011), at 34 ff.
142. R. Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (2009).
143. See, for instance, Woolf, above n. 99, at 5, endorsing the view that ‘the
philosophy of litigation should be primarily to encourage early settle-
ment of disputes’.
of litigation to litigants and the State proportionate to it.
The impetus for reform was thus entirely separate from
austerity.
The 2011 consultation first recommended the small
claims track limit should increase to take account of
inflationary changes in the value of money since 1999.144
As such it would bring claims that would in the past
have been small claims but due to the operation of infla-
tion now fell outside its financial limits back within the
scope of the process. It also recommended that the limit
increase in order to bring simple fast track claims that
could readily be dealt with effectively on the small
claims track to be brought within the latter’s scope.
This, it was argued, would increase access to the courts
for small businesses, which would otherwise avoid liti-
gation due to the costs regime applicable to the fast
track. Such a reform would equally, it was argued,
increase judicial efficiency thereby increasing the courts’
ability to deal with claims more effectively. It was thus
justified by the wider commitment to increasing access
to justice through making available proportionate pro-
cesses to a wider range of cases. In its response to the
2011 Consultation responses, the government confirmed
that the inflationary and small business rationales were
the two bases on which reform would be made.145 Aus-
terity had not role to play.
The expansion of the small claims mediation scheme
was also a product of the 2011 consultation. Again, its
rationale was unconnected to austerity and pre-dated it.
As the consultation made clear, the promotion of media-
tion, as a form of alternative dispute resolution, was cen-
tral to the Woolf reforms and the CPR, i.e., it was a
product of the 1990s reform of civil justice.146 The
expansion of small claims mediation was understood as
one way in which that aim could be realised more fully
than it had been between 1999 and 2011. This was to be
achieved by making small claims mediation ‘part of the
actual court process’ for the first time.147 The intention
was to ‘create a better environment within which settle-
ment can be explored, with the help of a mediator, so
that the parties do not have to proceed to what is often
seen as a stressful final hearing’.148 This would enable
all claims allocated to the small claims track, then 80,000
claims, to benefit from a mechanism that had produced
highly satisfactory results for 30,000 individual litigants
since it was introduced.149 Thus the aim was to better
enable litigants to benefit from mediation.
Actual reform of the two processes may not have been
predicated upon austerity, but there is one area of
potential reform that is partially predicated on it. In
2015 the Civil Justice Council recommended reforms
that, if implemented, would effectively replace both the
small claims track and small claims mediation process
144. Ministry of Justice (CP6/2011), at 35.
145. Ministry of Justice (2012), at 4 and 11.
146. Ministry of Justice (CP6/2011), at 39 ff.
147. Ibid., at 46. The Ministry failing here to appreciate the arbitration-based
origins of the small claims track.
148. Ibid., at 47.
149. Ministry of Justice (2012), at 4.
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with a new ‘online court’, which would deal with all low
value claims.150 The new court would provide both an
entirely digital, low cost, procedure that would provide
online mediation, case management and, where necessa-
ry, adjudication. The central aim underpinning the pro-
posal is to increase access to justice through making
effective use of modern technology. It was, however,
equally underpinned, by the aim of producing a ‘lower
cost court system’.151
Should such reforms be implemented and work as plan-
ned they would no doubt facilitate the achievement of
the second aim. It would be expected to do so through
eliminating the need for labour-intensive paper process-
es and the use of court buildings and hearing rooms. In
turn this would facilitate a reduction in the number of
administrative staff and judges; less work would need to
be carried out by both through digitisation of previously
paper-based processes, the increased use of automation
in terms of procedural management of cases and
through increasing the speed at which trials could be
conducted. Equally, by increasing referrals to and use of
mediation there would be an anticipated reduction in
judicial workloads, facilitating a reduction in judicial
numbers. As with the recommendations made by Jus-
tice, noted above, it is as yet unclear to what extent this
reform will be implemented. The scope for further
reductions to the courts’ budget in line with the need to
reduce public spending over the long term, if the pro-
posal is implemented, is however patent.
In summary, the evidence shows that while expansion of
both the small claims track and mediation scheme could,
in principle, have been driven by austerity either
through a potential increase in claims or due to a reduc-
tion in resources to the courts neither of these reasons
lay behind the reforms. Both were a further step in
reforms of English civil procedure that began in the
mid-1990s and were formally implemented via the
CPR’s introduction in 1999. This is not to say that any
future expansion in either the small claims limit or the
mediation scheme could not be predicated on austerity-
grounds. That possibility cannot but exist, as the Civil
Justice Council’s proposals for the development of an
online court demonstrate. It is, however, clear that aus-
terity did not underpin this round of structural reform.
4 Conclusion
Milton Friedman once stated that ‘…only a crisis –
actual or perceived – produces real change. When the
crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the
ideas lying around.’152 The international financial crisis
of 2007-2008 has every appearance of bearing this out in
so far as the English civil justice system is concerned. It
has produced a radical and continuing retrenchment of
150. Civil Justice Council, Online Dispute Resolution for Low Value Civil
Claims (2015).
151. Ibid., at 5.
152. M. Friedman cited in Blyth, above n. 1, at 103.
public spending in the United Kingdom.153 This
retrenchment is resulting in a degree of change, actual
and probable, to the civil justice system that has not
been seen since the 1870s when the present system was
put in place.154
One possibility for reform might have been to increase
the availability of simplified forms of civil procedure
beyond its established range, and beyond the level of its
actual financial extension that was effected for reasons
other than austerity. Use of the small claims track could,
for instance, have been broadened out to higher value
claims in order to provide both the parties and the court
with a quicker, cheaper means to resolve them. Reforms
introduced in 2013 provided for this. However, they
were unrelated to austerity. Moreover, such reforms
would not in any event meet the problems created by
austerity. Expanding use of the small claims track, or
small claims mediation, would not have met the real
issue caused by austerity: reduction in civil legal aid and
thereby legal representation and the consequence
growth in individuals litigating in person. To revert to
Friedman, the crisis for the civil justice system engen-
dered by the financial crisis is one that has centred on its
adversarial, lawyer-based, nature. Expanding the simpli-
fied process of the small claims track would not have
met that problem despite its more inquisitorial, less law-
yer-centric nature. It would not because the greater
complexity of the claims affected by austerity and the
reduction in civil legal aid it engendered renders them
unsuitable for the small claims track and its simplified
process or small claims mediation.
The question from Friedman then is which ideas that
could tackle the difficulties that the courts were facing
due to the increase in LiPs were lying around waiting to
be developed? The answer is twofold. First, the general
development of inquisitorial techniques across all civil
litigation and the prospect, given reform proposals, of
recasting the system in such a way that a new cadre of
quasi-judicial Registrars carry out both a case manage-
ment and inquisitorial, investigative function in all civil
claims. Secondly, the arguably undesirable development
of fee-paid McKenzie Friends as ersatz advocates.
These developments remain in their infancy. Use of a
more inquisitorial or investigative procedure remains
uncertain in scope and application. It remains unclear,
for instance, how far a judge may go in inquiring into
the facts through questioning witnesses. Given other
recent innovations in civil procedure such as the use of
concurrent expert evidence and the active role the court
has in questioning expert witnesses,155 it is a reasonable
assumption that having accepted a more inquisitorial
role for one form of witness, there no longer remains a
principled objection to a judge adopting a similar role in
respect of lay witnesses where one or more parties are
unrepresented. The inquisitorial fact-finding role may
153. Thomas, above n. 79, at 9-10.
154. As a consequence of the 1873-1875 Judicature Acts, as noted in n. 153,
at 12-13.
155. CPR PD 35.11.
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thus develop considerably. Equally, developments sur-
rounding the use of McKenzie Friends remain at an ear-
ly stage. One possibility, if concerns about their use are
acted upon, may see their ability to act as advocates
restricted. Conversely, their ability to act as advocates
could be tacitly or explicitly accepted and normalised.
More broadly, and perhaps more radically, the promo-
tion of fee-paid McKenzie Friends as advocates could
lead to a fundamental restructuring, and removal, of the
regulatory framework for the English legal profession in
order to increase competition and thereby reduce the
cost of legal services. If fee-paid McKenzie Friends do
become a normal feature of the system, the argument
that other providers of legal services require regulation
beyond consumer protection law, for instance, of the
application of the law of obligations, becomes more dif-
ficult to maintain. If we take these areas of reform
together, the consequences of austerity can be seen to
have already effected a fundamental shift in the English
civil justice system and its procedure. To the extent that
they have already engendered reform, it can rightly be
described as ‘real change’, change that remains unfinish-
ed.
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